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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
J. M. WEBB and
SPENCER WEBB,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
'MARGARET 'VEBB and
:MARGARET WEBB,

No. 7208

Administratrix of the Estate
of Wilmer Webb, Deceased,
Defendants and

Appellant~.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATENIENT
On October 26, 1946, the plaintiffs commenced this
action against the defendants to quiet title to a number
of parcels of real estate and water rights, and a number
of head of livestock and farm machinery and equipment,
all situated in Millard County, Utah. The real estate
consists of a home in Deseret, and a few tracts of farming land. After demurrers to the complaint were overSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ruled defendants secured more time to answer and finally
on June lOth, 1947, filed their separate answers and
counterclaim.
The answer and counterclaim of Margaret Webb, as
administratrix of the Estate of Wilmer Webb, by way
of counterclaim alleges that she married Wilmer Webb
on July 21st, 1945, and that he died intestate on the 4th
day of July, 1946, leaving her as his sole surviving heir;
that at the time of his marriage he was about 42 years of
age and was the owner of the property described in plaintiff's complaint, plus a few additional items of personal
property; that for many years prior to March 18, 1946,
Wilmer and the plaintiffs were partners in the farming
and livestock business and owned certain partnership
property; that on or about the 15th day of March, 1946,
by mutual consent of the plaintiffs and Wilmer the partnership was dissolved, at which time the plaintiffs promised to account for and pay Wilmer the proportionate
share of all moneys previously collected by them and to
render to the defendant on demand an accounting; that
the plaintiffs refused to account to her; that she has
been in possession of the home property and claims it as
a widow's homestead; that she and her husband on March
15th, 1946, executed to the plaintiffs a deed covering the
lands and water rights described in plaintiffs' complaint;
that about March 18, 1946, Wilmer executed to plaintiffs
a bill of eale to the personal property described in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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complaint; that said transfers and conveyances were
made without any other consideration than as a mortgage
to secure sums to be advanced for the benefit of Wilmer
and his wife. rrhe administratrix prays that the bill of
sale and deed be determined to be a mortgage, and that
the court require the plaintiffs to make an accounting to
her. (Tr. 19-23).

The amended answer of :Margaret Webb as an individual alleges much the same factual situation as the
answer of Margaret vVebb as administratrix, and in addition alleges tlm.t Wilmer began ailing in September, 1945,
and his ailment continued to grow worse until he was
hospitalized in March, 1946; but that she did not know
that his ailment would be fatal; that about March 15,
1946, an attorney for Wilmer and the plaintiffs fraudulently represented to her that it would be easier for plaintiffs to finance the medical care and hospital expenses if
she and her husband would turn over Wilmer's property
to plaintiffs; that the property was worth the sum of
$30,000.00; that she accepted a check for $500.00 as a
consideration for signing the deed but that the check has
never been cashed; that she did not intend to waive her
statutory one-third interest in her husband's property;
that the deed was made without consideration; that the
..· deed was procured from her with the express i~tention
of cheating and defrauding ~er and is void. She prays
thatby the
the
be set
asideprovided
andbytitle
to ofthe
property
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4
be quieted in the defendants. (Tr. 34-44).
The brief of appellants, pages 5 to 20, sets forth the
defendants' counterclaim in detail, and the above references to the allegations of the answer are therefore very
brief.
The trial court determined the issues in favor of the
plaintiffs and made rather extensive findings of fact and
concluded that the plaintiffs are the owners of the realty
and personalty and entitled to the immediate possession
thereof; that the defendants are entitled to take nothing
by reason of the counterclaims, excepting as otherwise
provided; that the defendants are not entitled to an accounting upon the evidence as produced in the trial, but
that the right to an accounting should be rejected and
denied without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
apply for an account hereafter, if she be so advised. A
decree was entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the
defendants accordingly. (Tr. 51-62). Also see appellants'
brief, pages 23 to 34.
ARGUMENT
Defendants Were Not Entitled to Trial by Jury
Appellants' assignment of error No. 1 urges that the
court erred in not granting a jury trial. There are a number of reason~. why the refusal of the trial court to call
out a jury is not error.
. A review of the pleading8, and a review of the facts
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5
and circumstances leading up to the request of 'the appellants' for a jury trial will be helpful in determining the
question here involved.
The action was commenced by a complaint setting
up a cause of action to quiet title to real and personal
property, (Tr. 4-8). We concede that under the decisions
of this Court a suit to quiet title has been held to be an
action at law. (Babcock vs. Dangerfield, et al., 94 Pac.
(2nd) 862, 98 Utah 10; Bolognese vs . .Anderson, 90 Pac.
(2nd) 275, 97 Utah 136; N orback vs. Board of Directors,
37 Pac. (2nd) 339, 84 Utah 506).
But the question still remains : Are the issues or the
major issues under the pleadings equitable. If equitable,
then respondents contend the appellants were not entitled,
as a matter of right, to a trial by jury.
We call attention to the concurring opinion of Mr.
tTustice Wolfe in the case of Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah 186,
129 Pac. (2nd) 568, at page 571, wherein it is said:
''In the cas~ of Norback vs. Board of Directors
of Church Extension Soc., 84 Utah 506,37 Pac. (2nd)
339, 345, this court laid down the rule: That 'If the
issues are legal or the major issue legal, either party
is entitled upon proper demand to a jury trial; but,
if the issues are equitable or the major issues to be
resolved by an application of equity, the legal issues
being merely subsidiary, the action sho:uld be regarded !ls equitable and the rules of equity apply.
Coulson vs. LaPlant, Mo. Sup., 196 S. W. 1144;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Southern Pac. Land Co. vs. Dickersont 188 Cal. 113,204 Pac. 576; Park vs. Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279, 60
Pac. 945."
The answer of l\Iargaret Webb, as administratrix of
the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, by way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, alleges that on the 15th
day of 1\{arch, 1946, Wilmer Webb and the defendant made
and executed to the plaintiffs a certain deed covering the
lands described in the complaint, but that it was given as
a mortgage and without any other consideration, (Tr.
21-22). Also that to further secure moneys to be advanced by the plaintiffs, Wilmer executed to plaintiffs a
bill of sale of the property described in plaintiff's complaint (Tr. 22). In the prayer defendant asks that the
deed and bill of sale be determined t<> be a mortgage or
mortgages, that the court find the amount advanced or
paid out by plaintiffs and require plaintiffs to convey all
of the property to the defendant under payment of such
indebtedness (Tr. 25).
The amended answer and counterclaim of Margaret
"\\-rebb, as the widow of Wilmer Webb, deceased, pleads
that on March 15th, 1946, an attorney for the plaintiffs
and Wilmer Webb called on her and made certain representations; that for a consideration of $500.00 she signed
the deed; that the deed was obtained from her and from
Wilmer, thereby vesting the apparent legal title to said
lands in the _plaintiffs; that the deed was obtained with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the intention of cheating and defrauding her out of her
widow's one-third right, title and interest in the property,
and without any consideration; that Wilmer Webb executed the bill of sale with the intention of cheating and
defrauding defendant and that the transfer was without
consideration andToid (Tr. 35-40); that she executed the
deed believing it was a mortgag·e, relying upon the representations made to her; that the bill of sale and deed
were given to defraud her out of her statutory one-third
right, title and interest in her husband's estate, and that
she will suffer great loss and damage for which she has
no plain or speedy adequate remedy at law, (Tr. 41);
that portions of the real estate described in the deed is
the home of the defendant and is claimed as a widow's
homestead, (Tr. 42). The prayer- asks that the deed and
bill of sale be cancelled and set aside, and if said instruments are not so vacated they be held to be mortgages
only (Tr. 42).
The answer of the administratrix (paragraphs VII,
VIII and IX of the first affirmative defense and counterclaim, Tr. 22-23), attempts to plead the right to an accounting, and prays that the court require the plaintiffs to
make an account of all receipts and disbursements from
or on account of claimed partnership property, (Tr. 25).
The major issues, therefore, were to be resolved by
an application of equity, and the legal issues, if any, were
merely subsidiary. In other words, the basi~· of the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiffs' claims and title to the property was the deed and
bill of sale passing title to them, and the execution of
both were a~itted and acknowledged by the defendants'
respective answers. The defendants themselves treated
. the issues as equitable and so announced to the court
when the case was called for trial, as evidenced by the
following:
THE CouRT : * * * There may be a question also
as to whether this is a case in which the defendant has a
right to a jury trial, being equitable issues involved, it
should be decided by the court in any event.
:MR. UDELL R. JENSEN: "\Ve had in mind that the jury
would be advisor-y to the court. 1\fay the record show the
money was tendered to the clerk before the setting, and
upon suggestion of the court that the money was returned
to the defendant's counsel.
THE CouRT: The record may show that the jury fee
was tendered to the clerk before re-setting of the case,
but not before the previous s.etting. (Tr. 89-90).
The plaintiffs' sole proof in their case in chief was
the introduction in evidence of the deed executed by :Margaret Webb and Wilmer \Vebb, and tlie bill of sale executed by Wilmer Webb, by which title to the realty and
water rig·hts, and personal property, passed to the plaintiffs. Since t.he execution of these docun1,ents were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pleaded by the defendants in their respectiYe answers,
there would be nothing·, so far as the plaintiffs' cause of
action is concerned, to submit to a jury. \Vhether the defendant Marg·aret \Yebb was entitled to claim a widow's
statutory one-third interest in the realty, and whether she
was entitled to claim a homestead, are questions of law
which would not, in any event, be submitted to a jury for
answer. The other issues, - those raised by the defendants' affirmatiYe defenses, appear to be equitable.
Respondents do not rest their contention that appellants were not entitled to a jury trial solely on the basis
that the issues raised by appellants are equitable. Respondents further- contend that the appellants were not
entitled to a jury trial because demand was not timely
made, and a jury trial was for that reason waived. In
all of the cases inYolving the question of a- right to trial
by jury, this Honorable Court has qualified that right by
holding that it exists only ''on proper application'' and
"if timely made." Certainly the defendants did not make
a timely demand for a jury. On the contrary, the record
shows the demand for a jury was made long after the case
had been originally set for trial and at a time when the
granting of a jury trial would have been inopportune
and would ha-ve necessitated a delay of perhaps several
months.
The complaint was filed October 26, 1946. Demur-_
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rers were filed N oveJUber 22nd, 1946. On January 20th,
1947, and again on April 7th, 1947, the demurrers were
overruled and defendants given fifteen days to answer,
(Tr. 359). On April 7th, 1947, defendants' counsel was
present in court, and the case was set for trial for May
13th, 1947. No jury was demanded, (Tr. 355-6). It is
true that answers were not filed on April 7th, but under
the order of the court the answers should have been, and
the court expected answers would be served and filed on
or before April 22nd. On :May lOth, 1947, upon application of defendants, they were given until June lOth, 1947,
to plead to the complaint, (Tr. 11). On :May 12th, 1947,
at the request of the defendants, the trial was continued
to June 26th, 1947, and on the same day, when the case
was again re-set for trial, the defendants did not request
or demand a jury (Tr. 356). Again it will be observed
that when this case wa,s re-set for trial for June 26th, 1947,
J
the answers should have been and the court expected
answers would be filed by June lOth. On June lOth, 1947,
separate answers of Margaret Webb, as administratrix,
and Margaret Webb, as an individual, were filed.
On June 16th, 1947, at request of the defendants the
trial was again continued over from June 26th, and again
re-set for trial for July 15th, 1947, without a request or
demand for a jury, (Tr. 356). On July 14th, 1947, and one
day before the trial date, for the first time, the defendants
rfq~~sted a jurr a~d

paid the jury fee, ('rr. 356).

Pr~"
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vious to July 15th, 1947, the defendants requested a fur·
ther continuance, and on July 15th, 1947, the following
proceedings were had in Court :
This case ha·ving· been heretofore set for trial
this date, and counsel for defendants having requested a continuance thereof and having also requested a jury trial, and counsel for plaintiff having
stated that he would resist a further continuance of
the. case unless trial could be had at an early date,
it was ordered that the case be set for non-jury trial
Wednesday, September 3rd, 1947, at ten o'clock
A. ~L The clerk was directed to notify counsel for
defendants of the setting and was also directed to
_return to defendants' counsel the jury fee tendered.
(Tr. 357).
It must be assumed from the foregoing proceedings
that an early trial could not be had before a jury, and
the court did not feel that the trial should be unduly delayed because of a request for a jury made after the case
had been set for trial several times and continued at the
request of the defendants, and particularly when the request for a jury was made one day before the trial date.
This Honorable Court should not assume the, action of
the trial court was arbitrary and without good reason,
but on the contrary should assume that with good reason
the trial court could not call out a jury during the month
of September. It is common knowledge that the population of Millard and adjoining counties consists largely of
farmers who are busy irrigating and later harvesting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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crops during the late summer and early fall of the year,
and it is very difficult to call out and· secure a jury at
that time of the year. It is also common knowledge that
in counties such as Millard, where the territory is large
and prospective jurymen are required to travel many
miles to the county seat, the cost to the county of calling
out a jury for a special case is prohibitive. Without doubt
the court felt an early trial could not be had if the case
.should be tried before a jury, and without doubt the court
felt the plaintiffs were entitled to an early trial after the
several continuances at the request of the defendants.
One of the rules of the District Court of the Fifth
.Judicial District provides as follows:
When a jury is demanded in civil cases, triable
by jury, a failure to deposit the jury fee required
by law· at the time of, or prior to the setting of the
case for trial, shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to a jury trial. (Tr. 357).
Under the above circumstances, it has been held by
this Court, in common with practically all other jurisdictions, that the demand for a jury was not ·made timely,
and hence was waived, and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a jury trial.
Sec. 104-23-6, U.C.A. 1943, provides: Either
party to an action of the kind enumerated in the preceding section who desires a jury trial of the same,
or of any issue thereof, must demand it, either by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
digitization
provided
by theto
Institute
Services
\Yritten
notice
toforthe
clerk
p1·ior
theof Museum
time and
ofLibrary
setting
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
such action for trial, or within such reasonable time
thereafter as the court may order, or orally in open
court at the t'ime of S'ltch setting * * * * .
The statute in question does not provide, as do the
statutes of some states, that a jury must be demanded
''after issue joined'' or that a case may not be set down
for trial until after all of the pleadings have been filed.
In the case at bar the record shows that the defendants'
counsel was in court at the time the case was first set
down for trial. The record shows also that the answers
of the defendants should have been filed long prior to the
trial date, and the ans·wers were delayed at the express
request of the defendants.
It was held in the case of Utah State Building and

·Loan Assn. vs. Perkins, et al., 53 Utah 474, 173 Pac. 950,

"it will be seen that the demand for a jury at the time the
case was called for trial came too late. Unless there is
some record showing a demand at the time specified in
the statute, a refusal, and an exception taken to the ruling
of the court, the matter is not before this court for review,
and the right or privilege of trial by jury will be held to
have been waived." Citing Nichols vs. Cherry, 22 Utah
1, 60 Pac. 1103; and Davis vs. D. & R. G. R. Co., 45 Utah 1,
142 Pac. 705, 709.
To the same effect are the cases of:
Board of Education of 8. L. City vs. West, et
al, 55 Utah 357; 186 Pac. 114;
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Emerson-B'rantingham Imp. Co.
59 Utah 54, 202 Pac. 543;

V$.

Giles, et al.,

It is a matter of discretion with court to allow or refuse a demand for a jury, when not made
within statutory time or extended time provided by
court rule, and it is not an abuse of discretion torefuse a late demand for jury trial, if no excuse is
shown for failure to make timely demand. Thomp.
son et ux., vs. Anderson, et al., 107 Utah 331, 153
Pac. (2nd) 665.
A party who takes a position which either leads
a court into error in procedure, or by conduct approves error committed by court, cannot later take
advantage of such error. Ludlow, et al., vs. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137
Pac. (2nd) 347.

When the case at bar was called for trial and when
the court announced there might be some question as to
whether the vVebb case was one in which the defendants
had a right to a jury trial because the issues involved were
equitable and should be decided by the court, counsel for
defendants did not urge that this was a law case in which
they had an unqualified right to a jury, but conced~d that
they had in mind that the jury would be advisory to the
court, (Tr. 89-90).
In the case of Osage Oil & Refining Co. vs. McDowell,
et al., 220 Pac. 609 (Okl), the court set a trial date for
Dec. 9, 1922, the parties in open court having waived a
jury. On Dec. 9th the cause was continued, without ob-
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jection, to the 15th day of December, 1922, when one of
the parties demanded a jury trial, which demand was
denied. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held the demand came too late. In the case at bar counsel for defendants was in court when the case was originally set
down for trial, and under the statute waived the right to
trial by jury by failing to make his demand at that time.
We contend that having once waived the rig·ht to trial by
jury, a litigant is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter
of right because of a continuance.
'Vhere action was called for trial and parties
waived a jury but trial was continued to a later
date, denial of request for a jury trial at subsequent
date was not an abuse of discretion. Ezzell vs. Endsley, 169 Pac. (2nd) 309, (Okl).
Refusal of demand for jury trial filed July 19th,
1935, in action commenced in April, 1934, in which
defendant entered appearance May 31st, 1934, after
case had been noted for trial in 1\tlay, 1935, is not an
abuse of discretion, since demand was not seasonably filed. Niemeier vs. Rosenbaum, 63 Pac. (2nd)
424, Wash.
The record shows that throughout the proceedings
the appellants adopted a course of delays in pleading and
further delays in getting the case to trial.
If the appellants are entitled to a trial by jury under
the circumstances herein enumerated it would be tantamount to holding that, having once waived the right to
a jury trial by failing to demand it when the case is orig-
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inally set, diligent attorneys and litigants who are ready
for trial at the time set cannot 1·egain that right, but the
dilatory can regain sueh a right by requesting and pro(•.uring one or more continuances. In fact, it would be
tauta1nount to holding that litigants,

lJ~·

securing one or

more delays or continuances after a ca:-;e is once set for
trial, could seen re a jury trial by artifice ai1d indirection
when such a right could not be otherwiHe secured. -

:B1 inding:-; of :b,act Arc Supported by Evidence
Appellants urge that the findings of fact are not supported by, but are contrary to, the preponderance of the
evidence.

Respondents, upon the contrary, contend that

the findings are not only supported by the evidence, but
that the evidence preponderates in f'aYor of the findings
and the trial court could not have properly found otherwise.

At the outset the appellants find themselves in the
unenviable position of asserting that the case at bar is an
action at law and consequently they were entitled to a
jury trial, and then urging that the trial eourt should be
reversed because the findings arc contrar:· to a prepoH·
deranee of the cYidence and "will iu l'l}Uify be vacated
and set aside." If the case be an action at Jaw and the
nwjor .iHsues are legal and not equitable,. then the rule
to bt> applied must be :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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supported by son1e substautial PYidenee cannot be
disturbed on appeal, tho the Supreme Court might
find diffel'ently. Jlu8scr l'8. JlcCoruick & Co., 57
rtah 6~, H1~ Pac. 105~.
t'et• abo:
Hait:;Oil l"8.

Grecllleaf, 62 Utah 168,

Kelley n·:. Jloab State Bank,
Pac. 366.
·
·
·

()J

~18

Pac. 969.

Utah 290, 230

Baker C8. lrycoff, 93 Utah HJ9, 79 Pae.
· 77, at page 83.

(~nd)

It will not be sufficient to say that the findings are
contrary to a preponderance of the evidence, since the
rule is that if there is any substantial evidence to support
the findings 1 the findings must be upheld.
Howe,·er, if this case be considered at:l one in equity,
then the rule to be applied is :
The Supreme Court on an appeal in an equitable action will consider questions of fact as well as
questions of law, but \\'ill not disturb findings of fact
where ~he evidence is conflicting; unless it is made
to appear that the findings are clearly against the
L'Yidence * * * . Gee, et al., rs. Baum, et al., 58 Utah
445, 199 Pac. 680.
SeL'

also:

Turubull cs. Jl eek, 58 Ctah 23, 196 Pae. 1008.

Si1zglelo·n rs. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63.

In the Singleton case above cited this court stated
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"unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings as made by the lower court its decision must
stand.''
The testimony, excluding the matters concerning an
accounting, is rather brief. The only evidence in the record upon which many of the pertinent 'findings are predicated, is that of :Margaret Webb, and Dudley Crafts, an
attorney at Delta. A review of their evidence will certainly convince this Court that there is substantial evidence to support such findings. In fact, it will convince
tlris Court that there is a preponderance of the evidence
to support such findings.
The findings of fact are comprehensive and determine
all of the issues raised by the pleadings. It appears from
the evidence and from the findings made therefrom that
Wilmer Webb was a man of about 42 years of age wheri
he and :Margaret vV ebb were married; that Margaret had
been married before and divorced and had three children
by a former marriage. There were no children born as
the issue of the Webb marriage. The parties were married on July 21st, 1945. "\Vilmer began ailing during the
month of September, 1945, and his ailment continued to
grow steadily worse until February, 1946; in March, 1946,
he was hospitalized at S-alt Lake. City and remained in
· the hospital until his death on July 4th, 1946. The parties
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between the parties and there was some discus~ion of a
separation and divorce. About March 15th, 1946, and
while Wilmer was in the hospital he discussed with Dudley
Crafts, an attorney at law, the marital difficulties then
existing between himself and wife, and requested Mr.
Crafts to visit Margaret and see if she was willing to
effect a reconciliation and remain at the home permanently and take care of Wilmer, and if she was unwilling
to do so, then to make arrangements with Wilmer's brothers, (respondents herein), to take care of him during the
balance of his lifetime and pay the expenses incident to
his illness and provide for him the balance of his lif~time.
The consideration for payment of the expenses and care
of Wilmer would be the transfer to respondents of Wilmer's property. At that time Wilmer knew he would be
unable to work for a considerable length of time and that
he might be an invalid for his remaining lifetime. Margaret was also aware of this situation.
Mr. Crafts visited Margaret and attempted to procure her consent to remain with Wilmer as his wife, and
look after Wilmer when he returned home. She informed
Mr. Crafts that a reconciliation would not be possible and
when the school term ended in May of 1946, she was going
to leave Wilmer, but wanted to occupy the home and use
his car until she left.
Mr. Crafts then suggested that under such circumstances the plaintiffs were willing to undertake Wilmer's
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support and pay all medical and hospital bills and take
care of him during his lifetime, but that it would be necessary under such arrangement to have Margaret's signature to a deed covering the realty. ~:iargaret stated she
did not want any part of the property, but upon the suggestion of Mr. Crafts said she would accept $500.00 if
the plaintiffs and not Wilmer were paying the money.
Mr. Crafts then prepared the deed and ~iargaret, out of
Mr. Crafts' presence, took it before a notary public and
executed and acknowledged it. The deed was then taken
to Salt Lake ·where Wilmer executed it, and .at the same
time executed a bill of sale to his personal property and
executed to the plaintiffs a transfer of the title to the car.
The deed and bill of sale and certificate of title to the car
were then delivered by Wilmer to the plaintiffs. Practically all of· the above facts are shown by the testimony
of Mr. Crafts, (Tr. 274 to 298).
The real estate with water rights were worth $8966.00
and the personal property transferred was worth $4671.00,
including war savings bonds worth $575.00. (Finding No.
15, Tr. 55) .
.A bout three months after the execution of the deed
and bill of salE• Wilmer died. Immediately after signing
the deed Mar~aret consulted an attorney and thereafter
did not casl1 the check, but she took no action to rescind
or annul the deed or repudiate the transaction until after
Wilmer's
death.
(Finding
No. provided
10, Tr.
54). of Museum and Library Services
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Aftpr Margaret. refused to 1·emain with " 7 ilmcr, or
to stay at the home beyond the school season, the plain~
tiffs, .Jack and Spencer \Yehb, brothers and former part·
ners of \Yilmer, ag;reed with Attorney Crafts, who was
representing \Yilmer, to take r.are of \Vilmer the balance
of his lifetime, and to assume and pay all of \Yilmer 'K
expenses. At that time \Vilmer was in the hospital and
many expenses had been incurred. }[ore could be antieipated in the immediate future and perhaps for months
and e,~en ~;ears to rome.
It is quite obvious from the record that marital dif .

ficulties commenced shortly after the marriage, and when
it became apparent to :Jiargaret that her husband was a
Yery sick man likely to be a permanent invalid, she was
going to "run out on him." It is equally obvious that
when :Margaret had reason to believe all of vVilmer 's property would be used up in paying tremendous hospital and
doctor bills, and that \Vilmer 's ability to support her and
her children was gone, she would not remain with him or
be tied down to or assume the care of an invalid. It
seemed obvious that all the assets would be dissipated
because in a period of approximately three months the
expenses amounted to many hundreds of dollars. There
was no percentage in ::\[argaret 's remaining, particularly
when two brothers were willing to assume Wilmer's care
during his lifetime, even though the assets did not cover
the expenses. She was more than willing to ''get out
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from under," but when Wilmer died in about three
months, and the expenses incurred were but $1750.00, she
found she had made a bad bargain and concluded to re.
pudiate the entire transaction and claim Wilmer's property. This Court cannot help but conclude from the tes·
timony that Wilmer's wife was callous and coldblo()ded,
without the slightest regard for her moral obligations as
a wife.
The correspondence between Margaret and Wilmer,
while Wilmer was in the hospital, shows the pattern, and
corroborates the testimony of ~Ir. Crafts to the effect that
:Margaret refu!?-ed to effect a reconciliation and intended
to leave in May as soon as the school season was over.
Defendants' exhibit "Y" (referred to as exhibit 3 in defendants' brief) is a letter written March 5th to Wilmer
and contains this statement: "It isn't fair to you to have
us here using your house and cream checks when you
could use them, so I will start looking around and see
what arrangements I can make. Then you won't have so
much to worry' about.'' On March 8th Margaret again
sent a letter to Wilmer, (Ex. 3), in which she said: "It
wouldn't look very good for me to walk out on you while
you are ill, so hurry and get well.'' On March lOth, after
receiving 1\iargaret's letters Wilmer begged her to stay
on and not leave him (Ex. E). He said to Margaret:
''Honey, you said you would do anything to help me while
I was up here.. You can· by at least staying until I can
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come home and can help me more by staying much longer
for I don't love anybody else. • ~ • You said you were
going to look around. Honey, please don't until I get
home. • • * '' On ~I arch 14th, in answer to Wilmer '8
letter, :Margaret stated, (Ex. R) : ''Don't worry about
anything down here we are getting along alright. I guess
things can go along like this for a while longer, at least
until you are on your feet again and can take care of your
self."
~irs.

Webb's answers on cross-examination (Tr. 142
to 161 and 169 to 184), attempting to explain what she
meant by the above statements in her letters, were so
evasive and unsatisfactory as to convince the trial court
that Mr. Crafts' testimony should be given greater ere~
deuce than the testimony of the defendant. In fact even
a casual reading of her· testimony must lead one to the
conclusion that her testimony is not entitled to credence
where it conflicts with the testimony of Attorney Crafts.
Mr. Crafts, an attorney who ha~ practiced law at
Delta, Utah, since 1924, testified that he was requested by
Wilmer Webb, as a friend, to intervie~ Margaret Webb.
This request was made while Wilmer was in the hospital,
and between March lOth and 14th. Wilmer advised Mr.
Crafts that his (Wilmer's) wife was going to leave him
and asked if an attempt should be made to effect a reconciliation, and if that could not be done what arrangements
should b.e made to take care of the expenses and to take
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care of him for the rest of his life. ::Mr. Crafts suggested
if the wife would assume no responsibility that Wilmer's
brothers be asked if they would take care of him for the
halance of his lifetime and assume the expenses of hospital, doctor hills, etc., and that he, Wilmer, make a property settlement with them by conveying his property to
them. (Tr. 276-277).

1Ir. Crafts then went to see "Jlargaret 'Vebb 011 :March
14th at Deseret. A rather lengthy conversation ensued
in which 1\'Ir. Crafts told :Margaret that Wilmer was very
ill and wanted to effect a reconciliation and have her continue 011 as his wife. :Margaret stated she never could
effect a reconciliation. She v\ras then told that Wilmer
would be a cripple and wouldn't be able to get around at
all for a year to a year and a half and was asked if under
those circumstances would she just stay in the house and
care for Wilmer during his illness. She said she was not
willing to do that - she definitely had made up her mind
to pull out as soon as the present school term ended and
under no circumstanees would she stay longer. (Tr. 279.280). She was then asked if she would he willing to make
a property f'ettlement and file snit for diYoree so Wilmer
" . .ouh1 know ho·w much he had to pay her, and how much
property he would haYc left to make arrangements for his
care during the remainder of his life. She stated all she
.wanted was to take what she had brought with her; that
they were married only a short time; that the children

I
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were not \Yilmer 'R; and she did not feel she was entitled
to any of 'Vilmer 's property, ( Tr. 280). She was then
told that if she was not willing to stay and take care of
'Vilmer, he "·anted her to take what part of the property
she thought she was entitled to and that he would then
conYey the rest of it to his brothers with the definite understanding that it would be their ohlig·ation to pay all his
bills and snpport him and giYe him personal care during
his remaining yPnrs. She was asked if she would join in
such a COllYe~·ance and she again stated she did not want
any of 'Vilmer 's. property but wanted only to remain in
the home until the school year ended and to have the use
of the car during that period, (Tr. 281). 1\Ir. Crafts told
2\Iargaret if ~he executed the deed she would he signing
away absolutely all rights of every kind in all property
and that she should not do so without some consideration,
and without some counsel. They discussed the sum of
$500.00 to he paid to her as the monetary cons~deration .
. (Tr. 281-282).
Thereafter ~[r. Crafts prepared the deed and took
it to :l\fargaret at Deseret, with a check for $500.00, and
requested her to sign the deed and have her signature
notarized. ~f argeret then walked across the street where
a notary was aYailable, signed the deed and brought the
acknowledged deed back to :Mr. Crafts and accepted the
ch<'ek for $500.00, (Tr. 282). Previously Mr. Crafts ad-·
visr<l1\Tnrg:aret that if Wilmer eame home Jack would take
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him right into his home and give him the best possible
care as long as he lived. Margaret stated she was sure if
Wilmer had a chance to think it over he would realize this
arrangement was for the best, (Tr. 284-285). Mr. Crafts
was not representing either of the plaintiffs. It should
be borne in mind that at all times Mr. Crafts was representing Wilmer, and Wilmer alone.
Some short time after the above conversation and
signing of the deed by Margaret, Mr. Crafts again visited
Wilmer at the hospital and related to him the results of
the conversation with Margaret. Wilmer then asked about
the arrangements which Mr. Crafts had with Jack and
Spencer· and was told that he (Crafts) had the promise
not only of the brothers, but their wives, that they would
care for him, (Tr. 286).
Mr. Crafts then testified that both Jack Webb and
Spencer Webb were advised on March 14th, 1946, that
Wilmer's condition was very serious; that some arrangements would have to be made for his care; that he might
live for a number of months or years but would never
again be able to do work and would likely be a cripple
the rest of his life; that some financial arrangements
would have to be made for Wilmer's care; that it was
probably Wilmer's desire that he convey his property to
them with the definite promise on their part that they pay
all of his doctor bills, hospital expenses and other obligations and would support and care for him as long as he
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lived, regardless of how long that might be. They were
asked point blank if they would be willing to assume the
responsibility of caring for Wilmer as long as he lived
and pay his bills, regardless of how much it might cost
them. Mr. Crafts insisted that they discuss the matter
with their wives, as the wives might have the personal
responsibility of nursing Wilmer. The plaintiffs and
Jack's wife were willing to take Wilmer into their home
and nurse and care for him as long as he lived, (Tr. 280281). On the following day, March 15th, after the deed
was signed by Margaret, 1Ir. Crafts told the plaintiffs
that arrangements had been made and they were definitely
to assume the responsibility of paying Wilmer's hospital
and doctor bills and other obligations and they agreed to
go up to Salt I..~ake the next day to pay the bills thus far
incurred, and when Wilmer came out of the hospital arrangements would be made to take him right into Jack's
home, (Tr. 293).
Spencer Vvebb testified that Mr. Crafts asked him
and .J aek if they would be willing to take on the responsibility of caring for Wilmer and paying his bills, etc., if
in return Wilmer's property was conveyed to them. Both
brothers agreed to the arrangement, (Tr. 299 to 303). J.
~f. (Jack) Webb testified to substantially the same thing
and to his obligation to assume joint responsibility with
Spencer, (Tr. 324 to 328).
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It appears very clearly from the record that there is

ample support in the e\·idence upon which to predicate
the findings. The defendant, l\Iargarct \Y ebb, both as
the 'vidow of Wilmer \\T ebh and as the administratrix of
his e~tate, had the bun}en of establishing her affirmatiYe
defenses and counterclaim, an<l she failed in such burden
of proof. Even under the equity rule, where the eYidence
is conflicting, this court will not disturb the findings of
fact because it is not made to appear that such findings
are clearly against the evidence. We are confident the
defendant has not and cannot indicate one single finding
or portion thereof that is not supported by the evi<lence,
or that is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.
Evidence as to Yalue of Property

Defendants complain that the Court erred in rejecting their offer to prove the Yalue of the home at Deseret
by showing the amount a purchaser was willing to pay
for it. ~rhe Court found the value of the home to be
I
$4000.00, as testified to by i\lr. Crafts, who qualified as
I
an expert on real estate YalHPf-1, (Tr. 273-27-t). rrhe \ritness :Mary A. Anderson te~tifiecl that fron1 her inquiry
concerning the value of the property she had a judgment
of its reasonable market value and that it was "·orth
$6000.00, (Tr. 269-270). r.rherefore the matter of whether
she was ·willing to bu:· the hmnc aull what she would pny
for it was immaterial, and the court was correct in so
holding.
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HowL·vcr, iu any eYeut, if we assumed that the t·ou rt
did err in refusing the offer,

~uch

error would be imnm-

terial. The court could still find the ,·alue to be $4000.00
1
ba~ed on the tl'~timony of attorney ( rafh;, a far better
authority on value~ than ~Irs. L\ndersou, the prospective
purchaser. Abo, if the couYeyauee of the property by
\Vilmer and his wife to the plaintiffs is upheld, the Inatter
of value

i~

of no importance.

Conversations Claimed by Appellants to Have Beer~
Hearsay and Confidential Should Nevertheless Have
Been Admitted by the Trial Court
\\' e are at a loss to know upon what theory the appellants contend that the testimony of Dudley Crafts in the
particulars set forth in their assignments of errors X os.
3 to 7, are hearsay or constitute confidential COlnmunications and therefore inadmissible. Certainly in appellants'
argument concenring such assignnwnts of error (their
brief pager; 85 to 57) nothing is said to indicate appel-·
Jants' theor:-·. In fact nothing appears excepting the bald
statement that such conversations are hearsay and privileged.
vVhen the plaintiffs introduced the bill of sale and the
deed, they made out a prima facie case and rested. rrhere
can bono question but what a conveyance is presumed to
ha,·e bC'Pll supported by a suffieient consideration; that
the law Jn·esumc~ at lea~d a nominal consideration; that
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t:4e burden of proof is upon the party seeking to avoid a
deed; and one attacking the validity of a deed has the
burden of defeating the presumption of consideration.
These principles are so well established and recognized
it is deemed unnecessary to quote authority therefor. (See
Babcock vs. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 Pac. (2nd) 862).
When plaintiffs rested, Margaret Webb took the wit..
ness stand in support of her affirmative defenses and
counterclaim and testified at great length to the conversation between herself and ~Ir. Crafts. She testified to the
things which she said Mr. Crafts told her. Certainly having opened up the matter of this conversation, Mr. Crafts
was then properly permitted to state what he told Margaret Webb, even if in such testimony he was repeating
what Wilmer Webb told him. Counsel for 1Iargaret Webb
asked her concerning a conversation with Wilmer Webb
in the hospital on the morning of March 18, 1946, after the
deed had been executed, at which time plaintiffs were not
present, (Tr. 126-127). This conversation had to do with
the transaction in question and particularly concerning
the home, and whether Wilmer knew the home was inchided in the deed. When Mrs. Webb testified to conversations with her husband held outside the presence of the
plaintiffs she could not with ·good grace object to Mr.
Craft's testimony concerning conversations with \Vilmer
about the same matter and tending to dispute :Margaret's
testimony.
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ject and respondents contend they were then entitled to
meet the situation with testimony of the same kind and
character.
:Margaret testified that her husband never received
anything· for signing the deed or bill of sale. This testimony was permitted to stand over the objection of the
plaintiffs, (Tr. 140). She also testified that Mr. Crafts
told her if Wilmer was ever able to work and run his farm,
all he would have to do would be to repay the money that
was paid out for him and take back his property, (Tr. 142).
This testimony on the part of :Margaret Webb was intro-·
duced clearly in support of her allegation that there was
no consideration for the execution and delivery of the
deed and bill of sale. The conversations between Mr.
Crafts and Wilmer as to the promises made by tl;le plaintiffs to take care of him, and the conversations between
Crafts and the plaintiffs concerning their promises and
agreements, were in refutation of the claim of defendants
that there was no consideration. Such evidence cannot be
excluded under the hearsay rule, even if held in the absence of the defendants.
If plaintiffs cannot testify to their agreements to
take care of Wilmer and pay Wilmer's bills, -as the consideration for taking title to the property, merely because
such promises were not made in the presence of Margaret,
then how can they refute :Margaret's testimony that ''she
did not know of her husband receiving anything for signSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing the deed and bill of sale.'' They could testify to such
promises made to Attorney Crafts, who was the representative of Wilmer, the same as they could testify to having
made such promises and agreements directly with Wilmer
if the conversations had been with and made directly to
Wilmer. Would they be precluded from testifying to
their business deal and arrangement with Wilmer merely
because Margaret was not there, when she was claiming
there was no consideration .and that very fact was the
point in issue.
If Mr. A contests Mr. B 's title to property because it
is claimed'' B'' paid no consideration for such property,
is '' B '.1 unable to testify to the amount paid, to whom and
when paid, and the circumstances of payment merely because A was not there to hear the deal made between B
and B 's vendor or see the passing of the consideration.
Snch a contention seems absurd.
It is claimed by appellants that Mr. Crafts, being
"\Yilmer 's attorney, could not testify to conversations with
his client after the death of the client without the consent
of the administratrix. Such a contention is not supported
either by any cases or texts cited. The true rule is set
forth in Jones on Evidence (2nd Ed), Vol. 5, Section 2164,
as follows:

' ' In addition to the exception to the general
rule excluding confidential communications between
attorney and client where questions concerning the
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circumstances surrounding the execution of a will
are in issue, it seems that the general rule yields to
necessity in somewhat analogous instances in some
jurisdictions, at least. Thus where, after the death
of the client, litig·ation arises between parties all of
whom claim under the client and the question to be
determined is not the existence of a right of action
against the estate but the intention of decedent as
to creation of various rights which remain ambiguous, the attorney may testify. The reasoning is the
same as in cases where the facts surrounding the
execution of a will become material. In the broad
sense of the term, all such matters are part of the
'res gestae,' that is to say, the issue being directly
as to whether the client did or did not have such
knowledge or do. such acts or give rise to or control
the rights of the parties, determination of the fact
directly determines the rights of the parties. It
would be a harsh rule to permit one claimant, who
claims by aJlegation under the client, to seal the lips
of an attorney who is the sole repository of the evidence as to the basic merits of the claim as against
another equally claiming under the client. The
client, tho deceased at the time, must be presumed
to have consented that under such a state of circumstances the attorney should speak, even tho
communications which would h!J.ve been confidential
and privileged during the lifetime of the client and
under other circumstances, are thereby divulged.
Thus an attorney has been permitted to testify in
an inquiry to ascertain as between devisees under
the client's will and a grantee claiming under a deed
from the client made after the will, as to what was
intended by the deed."
So far as consideration is concerned, Margaret signed
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the deed freely and voluntarily so as to be relieved from
her responsibility of caring for Wilmer, and for a consideration of $500.00. That disposes of her statutory onethird interest which she is claiming as Wilmer's widow.
As to the remaining two-thirds interest which she is claiming as administratrix of Wilmer's estate, Wilmer had a
right to dispose of that by will to someone other than Margaret or to deed it to anyone without her consent. He did
dispose of such interest for a consideration that in his
judgment was equitable and fair, and for a consideration
which we will show later is legal and recognized as consonant with public policy. The administratrix is in no
better position than Wilmer Webb, and what would not be
hearsay as to Wilmer would not be hearsay as to her. If
Wilmer were alive, testimony by the plaintiffs that they
agreed to his proposition and so advised his attorney and
representative would be admissible. Would Wilmer be
permitted to say, after executing and delivering the deed
under the arrangements present in this case, and after the
plaintiffs paid out for his benefit some two thousand dollars, and assuming plaintiffs were willing, ready and able
to continue with their end of the bargain, that plaintiffs
could not testify to the arrangement because the arrangement was made with Wilmer's attorney and representative? Such evidence would not be hearsay as to Wilmer
and would be admissible against him. And by the same
token it is admissible against his administratrix.
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Any testimony by :Mr. Crafts or anyone else as to
statements made by \Vilmer in his lifetime concerning
the disposition of his property and the fact that he conveyed it to someone else, is admissible, even as against the
hearsay rule, after his death. The rule is stated in Jones
on Eridence (2nd Ed) Vol 3, Sec. 1164; and is set forth
in the case of Stoddard vs. Newhall, 81 Pac. 666, at page
667, as follows :

Now it has been held over and over again in the
analogous case of declarations against pecuniary
interest that the declarations of the deceased person
may be received not only to prove so much contained
in it as is adverse to his pecuniary interest, but to ·
prove collateral facts stated in it, at all events, so
far as it relates to the facts which are not foreign
to the declaration and may be taken to have formed
a substantial part of it~
The declaration of a locator of a mining claim
that he had conveyed the property by deed, and had
been paid therefor, is an admission against his interest, and admissible after his death._ Scott vs.
Crouch, 24 Utah 377, 67 Pac. 1068.
To the same effect is Smith vs. Hanson, 34 Utah 171,
96 Pac. 1087.
Miscellaneous
The appellants take the position also that a conveyance made for support and maintenance, or a contract or
a~reement to convey in consideration of future support
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and maintenance, is against public policy and not based
upon a valuable consideration; and that there is a presumption that such a contract is not fairly made.
We find no case in Utah on this direct proposition
but other jurisdictions have passed squarely on it and
have held that a deed given under such circumstances is
supported by a good and sufficient consideration.
Where an old lady granted her realty, worth
$40,000.00 or more, reserving a life estate to herself,
to her intimate friend, who covenanted fully to support and maintain the grantor, the con,~eyance -was
supported by consideration. Rogers vs. Scott, 1511
Pac. 379 (Cal).
Conveyance by aged and invalid man in return
for care and support for remainder of his life, made
at time when it was possible hat he might live for
years, and when grantee was required to give up
employment to care for grantor, held supported by
sufficient consideration, tho graJ.ltor died within
short time. Johnson vs. Studley, et ux., 252 Pac.
638 (Cal).
And in the Johnson vs. Studley case, supra, the California Court made this observation, (252 Pac. 638 at pag·e
647):
The matter of the 90nsideration for a grant or
the assignment of property is, in conceivable cases,
of controlling importance, particularl~r where the
considerat~on appears to be grossly inadequate.
r.rhis declaration has pcenliar application to suits in
equity for the enforcement of executory agreements
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for the sale of real property. But in such cases, as
in actions like the one before us, "the sufficiency
of the purported or claimed consideration for a contract of the character under discussion must be determined from the facts of the transaction as they
existed when the contract was made, rather than by
subsequent developments.''
''The sufficiency of a purported consideration
for a contract must be determined from the facts of
the transaction as they existed w·hen the contract
was made rather than by subsequent developments.''
Long Beach Drug Co. rs. United Drug Co., 88 Pac.
(2nd) 698, at page 701.
The instant case is not one involving the rights of a
husband and wife, as between themselves, or one where
a husband has made a property settlement with the wife
or has procured some post-marital agreement or made -a
settlement with the wife in anticipation of a divorce, and
cases dealing with the above subjects are not applicable.
The evidence in the case at bar is to the effect that :1\Iargaret refused to stay with \Vilmer and take care of him,
but was perfectly willing to execute the deed and accept
$500.00 and let \Vilmer's brothers and their wives assume
the personal responsibility of caring for an invalid, besides
assuming the responsibility of paying all expenses in the
years to come. Had \Vilmer lived for several years and
a goodly part or all of the assets which he turned to his
brothers been used up in payment of hospital bills, doctor bills, medicines and other expenses, :Margaret would
have felt she 1nade a good bargain, and it was a good ridSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dance. The court found that Margaret knew she was exe-.
cuting a deea for the home as well as other realty and
that she did not intend to live in or use the home after
1\:fay of 1946, that she was informed as to the kind of
property owned by her husband and had some idea of
its value. There is no evidence whatsoever, outside Margaret's own bald statement, that any advantage was taken
of her. As a matter of fact Mr. Crafts went out of his way
to explain to her the nature of the transaction and to
advise her to consult someone respecting the execution
of the deed. Even though she stated she did not want
anything out of Wilmer's estate, Crafts practically insisted that she take $500.00. The cases and authorities
cited by appellants concerning future support, right to
maintenance or alimony, etc., have no application in the
instant case.
Proof Does Not Show Right to Further Accounting
Respondents agree with the appellants that the pleadings .establish the fact that prior to March, 1946, there
was a partnership between Wilmer Webb and the plaintiffs and that by mutual consent the partnership was
dissolved. But we cannot agree with appellants that they
are entitled to any accounting for the property described
in the deed and bill of sale, or for any bonds or other property turned over to the plaintiffs by Wilmer. As a matter
of fact the record diseloses that the defendants were permitted by the court to go into the matter of an accounting
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exhaustively, and many exhibits and much proof was
introduced by the defendants attempting to establish
that the plaintiffs came into possession of a considerable
amount of partnership property not included in the bill
of sale.
When the defendants rested their main case, and
after going fully into the so-called partnership matters,
they "reserved the question on account," (Tr. 272). Then,
later, when the defendants concluded their surrebuttal,
the following proceedings appear (Tr. 350 which is page
263 of the reporter's transcript) :
THE

CouRT: Do you rest f

~IR. JENSE~:

There are these questions, your Honor,
that deal with the part~e~ship, and these cattle and these
papers we have asked that they have produced to aid- the
court in determining the necessity of an accounting.
(Discussion).
CouRT: Is it agreeable to both sides that the
case be disposed of as to the issues, except as to the issues
as to whether there should be an accounting had by the
plaintiff to the defendant as administratrix~
THE

MR.

CLINE:

It is agreeable with us, your Honor.

CouRT: Is it agreeable to the defendants that
the issues exclusive of the demand for an accounting be
disposed of at this time, and that the case be left open for
THE
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the court to decide whether there should be an accounting,
and if so, when to take further evidence~
MR. JENSEN : I think that would be true as to the
specially described property.
(Discussion).
THE CouRT : Are you willing to submit the case exclusive of the issue as to whether an accounting should be
required?

MR..

J ENSEN-s

Yes.

CouRT: And then either argue it on that issue
later or reopen for further evidence on either side if you
see fit to put in eviden,ce.
THE

MR. J ENSENS Yes.
THE

CouRT: You may proceed to argue the case.

We have no quarrel with the law quoted by appellants
in their brief at pages 102 and 103 thereof concerning an
accounting as between a partner and the legal representative of a deceased partner. In this case the partners
themselves, during their lifetime, ~issolved the partnership, and when Wilmer passed away there was no partnership.
Appellants state that the deed and bill of sale do not
purport to transfer Wilmer's right to payment for the
property therein described, nor to his cash, water stock,
bonds, accounts receivable, etc. Of course the deed and
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bill of sale do not on their face purport to transfer Wilmer's right to payment for the property. But the record
itself shows the consideration for the conveyances. The
record shows that \Vilmer, with Margaret's full knowledge and consent, was turning all of his property to the
plaintiffs in consideration of maintenance and support
and the payment of his outstanding hospital, doctor and
other indebtedness. The record shows that Wilmer transferred title to his car to the plaintiffs about the same time
as he signed the bill of sale, and that he turned his bonds
to them and they took possession of the bonds under the
same arrangement.
The bill of sale covers all of Wilmer's right, title
and interest in all machinery and equipment of every
kind, nature and description owned by Webb Brothers.
It also covers all other livestock owned by him or in which
he had an equity. The court found that such disposition
disposed of any right to an accounting insofar as livestock,
including cattle and pigs, and machinery was concerned.
Defendants were clearly not entitled to any accounting
for bonds or property that Wilmer conveyed to the plaintiffs in accordance with the agreement for support and
maintenance, etc. vVhile the defendants contended that
the water stock was personal property, yet the deed con·
veyed not only the realty but all appurtenant water rights,
however evidenced.
The defendants were permitted to go fully into the
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matter of the partnership assets. They called witnesses
of their own. They examined the plaintiffs. They introduced numerous exhibits. Nothing was uncovered by the
defendants showing that the plaintiffs had done away with
or appropriated to their own use property which properly
belonged to the estate of Wilmer vVebb. Defendants, in
their brief, have not indicated or suggested wherein they
are entitled to an accounting. They have not pointed
out wherein they were prevented by the court from presenting any further or additional proof to show their
right to an accounting. It is not sufficient to merely
allege in a pleading that the litigant is entitled to an
accounting in order to require the court to order an accounting. The person asserting such right is required to
produce competent and sufficient evidence showing a
right to an accounting, and to produce competent and sufficient evidence thereafter that there are assets and properties to which he is entitled.
Plaintiffs and defendants agreed, at the conclusion
of the trial, that the issues, exclusive of the demand for
an accounting, be disposed of immediately, and that the
case be left open for the court to decide whether there
should be an accounting and if so, when to take further
evidence, (Tr. 351). While the record is silent as to any
further proceedings in court, yet finding No. 19 (Tr. 56),
recites as follows :
"That it was stipulated in open court by coun-
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sel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants
that the defendant :Margaret l.N ebb, as administratrix of the Estate of \Vilmer Webb, deceased, was
entitled to. and should have delivered to her one
thirty-two caliber Special Winchester Rifle and
case, one pair of field glasses and one wrist watch
in the event the wrist watch js located by either of
the plaintiffs, and that there should be paid to her
flS such administratrix the sum of $90.00, being onethird of the value of one hundred bushels of grain,
an additional sum of $90.00 being the equity of Wilmer Webb in $270.00 of partnership assets paid to
plaintiffs for feed pellets, and the additional sum of
$141.00 being the equity of vVilmer Webb in $423.00
of partnership assets paid to plaintiffs for alfalfa
seed, and the court finds, pursuant to the said stipulation that the foregoing property and foregoing
sums of money are assets of the estate of Wilmer
Webb and in the possession of said plaintiffs.''
This indicates that the parties stipulated to whatever
assets might be due the administratrix of Wilmer's estate. In the light of this stipulation it seems to the respondents that the burden of showing any right to additional or further moneys or assets. is on the defendants,
and this Court cannot assume that the stipulation does
not cover and was not intended to cover a complete settlement between the parties ; or at least this Court cannot assume that the defendants, since the conclusion of
the trial, have discovered any further proof to submit
to the court.
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ter of an accounting and did not preclude the defendants
from again litigating that issue, as is shown by Conclusion
of Law No. 7, (Tr. 58) as follows:
"That the defendant is not entitled to any accounting upon the evidence as produced in the trial
of said cause, but the right to an accounting should
be at this time and in this cause rejected and denied
without prejudice to the right of defendant to apply
for an accounting hereafter, if she be so advised."
A similar provision appears in the decree in paragraph 6 thereof, (Tr. 60).
The record shows the trial was concluded on September 6th, 1947. The findings and conclusions and decree
were signed on February 2nd, 1948, some four months
later. The files show a notice directed to the defendants
on December lOth, 1947, that on Decembr 15th, 1947, the
plaintiffs would call up for determination the matter of
the proposed findings, conclusions and decree submitted
by the plaintiffs, (Tr. 48). The files also show that on
December lOth, 1947, the court made an order that December 29th, 1947, was the time fixed for hearnig plaintiffs'
proposed findings and conclusions and that the defendants
have until December 22nd within which to prepare, serve
and file objections thereto (Tr. 50). No objections 'vere
filed or proposed by defendants to the finding or conclusion or to the provision in the decree that the right to
an accounting should be "at this time and in this cause
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fendant to apply for an accounting hereafter, if she be
so advised. ''
The record fails to show that at any time between
September 6th, when the tdal was concluded and for some
four months later when the proposed findings, conclusions
and decree were actually sig·ned, did the defendants request leave to present further proof on the issue of an
accounting. On the contrary the findings show that the
parties stipulated to certain items of property and moneys
which should be turned to the administratrix. In the absence of a sho·wing by the defendants that they asked leave
to introduce further proof, defendants should not no'v be
heard to complain concerning the court's action in rejecting an accounting as an issue, but without prejudice to
their right to pursue the matter further if they be so ad-,
vised. It is true, that as a general rule, a court must dispose of all of the issues presented by the pleadings and
proof. This the court did on the record made by the defendants. Defendants failed to proffer further proof or
even request more time within which to do so, and the
trial court probably went farther in protecting the rights
of the defendants than it was required to do, when the
accounting matter and issue was disposed of without
prejudice to the right of defendants to apply for an accounting hereafter.
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We submit, therefore, that the decree of the trial
court should be affirmed in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, wILSON

& CLINE,

Attorneys for Respondents.
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